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Introduction 
 
1. The Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) and the Consultative Council of 
European Prosecutors (CCPE) both have the task to annually draft an opinion to the 
attention of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE on a given theme. For 2009 the 
Committee of Ministers wishes these two bodies to draft an opinion in common. The draft is 
prepared by a working group consisting of members of either councils. For 2009 the theme 
is: 
 
“The relations between judges and prosecutors” 
 
2. Public prosecutors and judges are major players in the administration of criminal 
justice. During the whole criminal process there are important relations between judges and 
prosecutors. During the investigation of major crimes by the police rather often special 
investigation methods have to be applied and coercive measures have to be taken. 
  
3. In many CoE countries no special investigation methods can be applied nor coercive 
measures can be taken by the police or the prosecution service without a prior warrant by the 
court or a judicial order. In particular special investigation methods or coercive measures that 
seriously infringe constitutional rights like the search of premises, taking a suspect into 
custody, interception of communication, monitoring or technical surveillance require in many 
countries a judicial warrant.  
 
4. Before a judicial warrant can be issued the court or a judge has to assess the 
compliance with the statutory requirements of the methods or measures. After the 
termination of the investigation the public prosecutor has to decide upon the prosecution. Are 
there sufficient reasons of public interest to address the court? In the majority of the CoE 
countries once the prosecutor has decided to prosecute, the court has to deal with the 
criminal case. The court does not have the power to refuse a case, e.g. due to the lack of 
public interest. 
 
5. The court, however, can dismiss a case when the prosecution service presents 
evidence that is illegally obtained or when the prosecution service otherwise acted seriously 
unfair. Furthermore the court may acquit the suspect due to insufficient evidence of guilt. 
 
6. The court may control and assess the investigation and prosecution activities of the 
public prosecutor and when these have been legal and fair, may impose a sentence in case 
of sufficient evidence and proof of guilt. The public prosecutor on his turn enjoys the 
possibility of lodging an appeal with a higher court when he disagrees with the judgement or 
the verdict until the court in highest instance gives a final decision. 
 
7. From the early beginning of the process of the administration of criminal justice until the 
end of the process, i.e. the implementation of the sentence, public prosecutors and judges in 
many matters have to cooperate. Public prosecutors and judges, although separate 
institutions, are related to each other as the congruent spirals in a DNA double helix.  
 
8. Before starting the preparatory work of an opinion, for further depth and knowledge in 
this field, the members of the working groups need a precise presentation of the different 
status between judges and prosecutors as well as the differences amongst prosecutors in 
the different Member States of the CoE. I have been asked to prepare such a presentation 
(email secretary CCJE December 8, 2008). In the instructions I received it was underlined 
that the presentation should not be a detailed document precising the situation in each 
Member State but a presentation of the different group of status, with examples of States, in 
order to better understand what sort of relationship can exist between judges and 
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prosecutors. On January 10, 2009 I received the information note CCJE-GT(2009)3 
containing preliminary views by the CCJE Delegations on the content of the opinion. 
 
9. I have taken these preliminary views as starting point for this report. In this report I will 
deal with: 
 
Constitutional safeguards or constitutional law considerations about the link between 
independence of judges and an independent exercise of prosecution, in particular with 
reference to instructions from the executive branch.  
 
10. Instructions by the executive branch as a rule will be issued in relation to the utilization 
of discretionary power. When the prosecution service has the absolute statutory obligation to 
prosecute every crime that is brought to its attention, provided that sufficient evidence of guilt 
exists, instructions by the executive branch cannot have an impact on the prosecution. 
 
11. Instructions are used as an instrument to pursue a prosecution policy and to reduce the 
discretion of individual public prosecutors. Therefore the first chapter deals with discretion 
and instructions. 
 
12. In many CoE Member States the prosecution service may exercise discretionary power 
to waive a case or to divert a case without any control or interference of a criminal court. 
Only in a few countries (like Germany) the court may be involved in a decision to waive a 
case or to apply a diversionary measure. In such cases a judicial authorisation may be 
necessary. An important item under this heading will be the question how uniformity in the 
use of prosecutorial discretion can be achieved and who may control the prosecutorial 
decision. 
 
13. In a number of CoE Member States, where the prosecution service is empowered to 
apply discretionary power to waive a case, the interested party can file a protest against such 
decision by lodging a complaint with a court. The court then examines the manner in which 
the discretionary power over the prosecution was exercised. The court may order the 
initiation of prosecution if it holds the opinion that the public prosecutor misused his 
discretionary power. 
 
14. Such an avenue does not exist in the legal systems where the public prosecutor is in 
general required to obtain the consent of a judge before he can waive prosecution on the 
ground of expediency (for example Germany), or in countries adhering strictly to the legality 
principle. This avenue seems to be an element that influences the level of independence of 
the prosecution as well. 
 
15. The second chapter deals with the level of dependence or independence of the 
prosecution service. What is the present situation within the Council of Europe Member 
States? What various types of (in)dependence exist and are there major differences in 
dependence or independence between the prosecution services in Western, Central and 
Eastern European countries? In case the prosecution service is dependent and public 
prosecutors do not have a similar status as judges, what measures can be taken to avoid 
that its relation to the executive power and its institutional dependence may be abused by 
political authorities? How can be prevented that political authorities prevent certain offences 
being submitted for assessment by a judicial authority? 
 
16. In the third chapter I will deal with some special topics related to the relation between 
the public prosecutor and the judge. The first topic is the impact of simplified criminal 
procedures on the role of public prosecutors. In some countries in the CoE one can see a 
trend to vest the public prosecutor with adjudicatory powers. That seriously changes his 
relation with the judge. The second topic is whether a public prosecutor is considered to be a 
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magistrate or a civil servant. As a magistrate he seems to be less dependent from the 
executive branch than him being a civil servant. The third topic is the professional status of 
public prosecutors and judges. 
 
I. Discretion and instructions related to the prosecution of crimes 
 
1. Introduction 
 
17. One remarkable feature of present day criminal law enforcement in the majority of the 
CoE countries is that only a small percentage of all the crimes recorded by the police are 
actually tried by criminal courts. 
 
18. One important reason for the discrepancy between the number of registered crimes 
and crimes tried by courts, is that the public expenditure for the law enforcement agencies at 
large has not kept pace with the rising crime rate. Consequently, the police have been 
increasingly forced, because of resource considerations, to fix priorities in detecting and 
investigating crimes.  
 
19. A second reason why relatively few cases are tried by criminal courts is that in many 
countries an increasing number of cases are settled out of court by the prosecution service. 
While this movement originally was driven by efforts to socialise, humanise and rationalise 
the administration of criminal justice, the emphasis has increasingly shifted towards the need 
to reduce the pressure on the criminal law administration. 
 
20. The prosecution service in many countries in Europe is vested with powers to divert 
cases out of the formal flow of criminal justice and to deal with criminal cases outside formal 
court procedures, e.g. when the prosecution service decides to waive a case and not to 
proceed further with it or to divert the offence to a settlement or reconciliation between the 
victim and offender, without further involvement of the criminal justice system. 
 
21. Other such methods include the use of a caution, an oral or a written admonition, a 
transaction, a simplified procedure, a referral to legal bodies other than the criminal courts, 
and various other forms of diversion. These methods aim at diverting the suspect out of the 
criminal justice system at the earliest possible stage. Once such an alternative method has 
been applied in a case, prosecution can no longer take place and no judicial assessment of 
the crime takes place. 
 
22. The extent to which the prosecution service diverts cases away from the criminal justice 
system primarily depends on the legal basis for the prosecutorial power. 
 
2. The utilisation of discretion by prosecutors and judges 
 
23. Both the public prosecutor and the judge are exercising powers: prosecutorial power 
and judicial power. The power shall be exercised in the benefit of a proper administration of 
justice and in accordance to law. 
 
24. Both public prosecutors and judges have margins of discretion when exercising power. 
There are two major fields where prosecutors and judges exercise discretionary power. 
Public prosecutors may exercise discretionary power when deciding on prosecution or non-
prosecution and judges may exercise discretionary power when deciding on sentencing. 
 
25. The prosecutorial decisions made by prosecutors influence other actors in the criminal 
justice framework. Not only does his decision involve profound consequences for the 
offender, but repeated refusals to prosecute certain crimes may also lead to a decline in the 
investigation and charging of such offences by the police. In addition, the charges brought 
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against an accused largely delineate the adjudicatory and dispositionary functions of the 
courts. The prosecutorial decision consequently has a significant impact on other criminal 
justice agencies, and on their everyday functions. 
 
3. Prosecutorial discretion 
 
26. Two basic principles provide the basis for prosecutorial policies: the legality principle 
and the opportunity principle (the expediency principle). 
 
27. The primary premise of the legality principle is that prosecution must take place in all 
cases in which sufficient evidence exists of the guilt of a suspect, and in which no legal 
hindrances prohibit prosecution. Adherence to the legality principle in the procedural sense 
means that the prosecution service cannot exercise any discretion over the prosecutorial 
decision.  
 
28. In Europe there are only a few countries with a strict legality principle, like Italy and 
Spain. In Italy the legality principle is even laid down in the Constitution (Sect. 112). Although 
the Italian and Spanish laws require compulsory prosecution, the prosecutorial decision is, in 
practice, influenced by how, when and in what case, it is made.  
 
29. The public prosecutor can decide how to organise his work and he is consequently able 
to give priority to certain cases. Out of the day to day influx of cases send in by the police he 
will select cases in which a decision to prosecute has to be made with priority. In other cases 
a decision on prosecution is less urgent, which may lead to a deferment of the prosecutorial 
decision. 
 
30. The growing number of penal procedures, as well as the increasing complexity and 
social relevance of a large number of cases, has made prioritisation necessary. This, in 
effect, may lead to the elimination of low priority cases through the lapse of limitation period, 
or through the eligibility of the case for probable future amnesties. Such prioritisation is 
neither in Italy nor in Spain generally perceived as a violation of the rule of compulsory 
prosecution. 
 
31. The principle of opportunity, on the other hand, does not demand compulsory 
prosecution. Instead, it allows the prosecution agency discretion over the prosecutorial 
decision. 
 
32. These two principles therefore define the prosecutorial power differently, one confining 
its existence and utilization to certain definite rules, the other granting discretionary freedom 
in its utilization. 
 
33. The issue of which basic principle has been adopted in a country is only of concern with 
respect to public prosecution (state prosecution). Legal systems which allow private 
prosecution of offences have opted, with respect to such prosecution, for the expediency 
principle. Private prosecution exists as a right of the injured person, never as his duty. 
Therefore, the very existence of this right in a system adhering to the legality principle is an 
automatic deviation from this principle in favour of the expediency principle. 
 
34. Most of the countries adhering to the legality principle have made some legal 
exceptions to this principle, sometimes to such an extent that from a pragmatic viewpoint, 
these countries may be perceived as having a mixed system: the legality principle is applied 
in cases involving serious offences and the expediency principle is utilized in cases involving 
minor offences.  
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35. Due to the fact that in recent years legal exceptions to the legality principle have been 
extended in a number of European countries, or a more extended application of the existing 
exceptions has been permitted partly due to the introduction of diversionary measures, the 
systems applying the opportunity principle and those applying the legality principle have 
been approaching each other. 
 
4. Positive or negative approach of the expediency principle 
 
36. In most of the provisions which express the expediency principle or which ease strict 
adherence to the legality principle, some reference is made to the public interest. It is stated 
that prosecution may be waived for reasons of public interest, or if public interest does not 
require prosecution. 
 
37. It therefore seems that the expediency principle can be approached from both a 
positive and a negative perspective. When applied in the negative way, prosecution takes 
place as a rule, and prosecutorial waiver is an exception. When applied in its positive form, 
non-prosecution is the rule, and prosecution the exception.  
 
38. When the expediency principle is applied in its negative form, each infringement of the 
law is in itself a sufficient reason for the initiation of a prosecution, so that the prosecutor 
must justify his decision to waive a prosecution. That is, he must analyse the case in order to 
find reasons for non-prosecution. Obversely, when the principle is applied in its positive form, 
an infringement of the law is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to initiate prosecution; the 
prosecutor must analyse the case in order to find justification necessitating prosecution. 
 
39. Although this distinction between the two possible interpretations of the expediency 
principle may appear to be of a purely academic nature, in fact it may have considerable 
impact on the position of the prosecution service as an actor in shaping crime control policy.  
When the principle is applied in its negative form, the formal concept of crime seems to be 
taken as the initiating point for the administration of justice. It is the legislature which decides, 
by enacting penal law, that the penal law must be administered as a matter of principle. 
Within this context, the application of the expediency principle is an instrument in alleviating 
the consequences of the strict application of the legality principle by the prosecution service. 
The contribution of the prosecution service to the shaping of crime control policy is a limited 
one in this framework. Within this form, the prosecutor must therefore adhere to the specific 
rules formulated by the legislature for the administration of justice. 
 
40. When the principle is applied in its positive form, on the other hand, the expediency 
principle may be used by the prosecution service as a key instrument in shaping crime 
control policy. The legislature, by enacting penal laws, merely provides the legal basis for 
such a policy. The prosecutor then acts as a central figure in the determination of the 
practical prosecutorial policy. It is up to the prosecution service to decide, within the legal 
framework delineated by the legislature, how the administration of justice is carried out. In 
this form, prosecution is one of many avenues for achieving the goal of crime control. 
 
41. In most of the countries which adhere to the legality principle (the majority of the CoE 
Member States), as well as in those which have adopted the expediency principle (Belgium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway and some cantons of Switzerland), the prosecution agency can exercise some 
discretion in making the prosecutorial decision. In recent years, the legal exceptions to the 
legality principle have been widely extended in some CoE Member States, or a more 
extended application of the existing exceptions has been permitted.  
 
42. In general, it can be said that, even in systems which utilize the expediency principles 
in a generous manner, the division of state power (Trias Politica) as a rule does not allow the 
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executive power (the prosecution service) to interfere with the legislative power by not 
applying a law which is in force. That is, a waiver of prosecution should not become so 
extensive that it would amount to the practical decriminalisation of a criminal act. The power 
to criminalise or decriminalise acts resides with the legislature, not with the other agents of 
the criminal justice system. 
 
43. The legal reality that the expedience principle allows for the use of discretionary 
prosecutorial power in all types of crimes without exceptions does not mean that this 
opportunity is fully used in practice. Indeed, a wide range of crimes, particularly the more 
serious ones, seems to be excluded from the application of the expediency principle in the 
everyday administration of justice. Certain types of crimes (such as drug trafficking, offences 
which are generally of dangerous nature, crimes against life and liberty, and so forth), due to 
the nature of these offences, are offences for which prosecution should be instigated.  
 
5.  The extension or reduction of discretionary prosecutorial power 
 
44. The administration of criminal justice is a scarce resource. In all European countries the 
case-load of criminal courts has increased significantly as a result of a number of separate 
developments. In recent years, extensive legislative programmes have been carried out in 
many countries to bring a large number of socially dangerous acts within the scope of the 
criminal law. Furthermore, a general increase in crime has become apparent. Moreover, 
there has been an increase in the complexity of cases and in the number of cases involving 
serious and trans-national crimes. The expansion of the judiciary as a rule has not kept pace 
with this increase in case-load. 
 
45. In this light, it is essential that the prosecution service, which is the agency that can 
regulate the influx of cases to be dealt with by the criminal courts, possesses the 
discretionary power to decide which cases have to be brought before the court, and which 
cases can be dealt with by methods other than a court procedure. 
 
46. In a number of European countries, particularly in those which adhere to the legality 
principle, the legal scope of prosecutorial discretionary power has been gradually extended. 
This extension has manifested itself in at least four ways: 
 
– legislation has been provided which has noted that the principle of legality no longer forms 
the governing principle for the prosecutorial practice in regard to certain specified 
crime(s); 
– new grounds have been introduced for non-prosecution in legislation, or the threshold for 
the application of the existing rules has been lowered; 
– the legislature has deleted restraints which previously existed with respect to the use of 
the discretionary prosecutorial power; and/or 
– the judiciary, controlling prosecutorial decisions, has accepted an extended interpretation 
of regulations concerning the use of discretionary power. 
 
47. This extension of discretionary prosecutorial power may also result from changes in the 
prosecution service’s organizational structure or from changes in the policy of the 
prosecutorial service. The organizational structure of the prosecution service indeed has a 
great impact on the practical use of the discretionary power. 
 
48. In some countries, control over the prosecutor’s decision is exercised by the head of 
the local prosecution service, by personal contacts, by the review of the files or by 
compulsory prior consultation with a superior prosecution officer. In other countries, the 
hierarchical structure of the prosecution agency seems to be a contributing factor in the 
attempt to attain consistency in the prosecution policy. 
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49. In the legal systems adhering to the expediency principle, directives, guidelines, prior 
consultation or explicitly formulated objectives of a prosecution policy seem to be used as 
instruments for widening or curtailing the practical use of discretionary power. 
 
50. The reduction of the scope of prosecutorial discretionary power can take place through 
the utilization of the same instruments as those mentioned for the extension of the 
discretionary power. The reduction of discretionary prosecutorial power seems to be an item 
which is only of interest in legal systems which adhere to the expediency principle, or in 
systems which allow exceptions to the legality principle. It must be emphasized that a 
reduction in the scope of prosecutorial discretion cannot only be the result of explicit legal 
restrictions, but also of new legislation offering alternative ways of dealing with crime. This 
can particularly be the case where the criminal justice system offers two procedural 
extremes, the waiving of criminal cases on one hand, and the bringing of a case to court on 
the other hand. When legislation provides other solutions for such a dilemma, these solutions 
seem to affect, to some extent, the utilization of prosecutorial discretionary power. 
 
6. Judicial discretion 
 
51. Except in countries that have a system of trial by jury, judges decide on the basis of 
produced evidence whether the defendant is to be acquitted or convicted. In this decision 
some discretion is involved as well. Evidence that is produced must be assessed by judges 
and must be evaluated in order to be able to reach the conclusion that the defendant is 
proved by the evidence to be guilty or to be not guilty because the evidence is not 
considered to be sufficient for a safe conviction or the process which brought the individual to 
court was considered to be flawed or (police-)officers were considered to have behaved in 
such a way that the rule of law itself was undermined. All these decisions by courts contain 
elements of discretion. 
 
52. In many countries the criminal law does not know the system of mandatory compulsory 
or required sentences for certain type of crimes like in England and Wales or Germany 
where courts do not have discretionary power in sentencing in case of a conviction for 
murder. In these countries the court must impose a life sentence. However, a life sentence in 
the United Kingdom may differ considerably from a life sentence in Germany, not to speak 
from a life sentence in the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom the court in case of a life 
sentence may set a tariff that has to be served before someone can be eligible for parole. In 
Germany parole may be considered after having served fifteen years of a life sentence and 
in the Netherlands a life sentence really means imprisonment for life. 
 
53. In countries where the system of mandatory sentences is unknown judges may utilize 
discretion when deciding on sentences, both as far as it concerns the type of sentence 
(imprisonment, fine, etcetera) and as far as it concerns the amount. 
 
54. As a rule the absence of mandatory sentences and the wide discretion is an expression 
of the faith in the judiciary. However, a problem of the discretion is that the sentencing may 
be arbitrary or inconsistent. 
 
7. Equality before the law 
 
55. A common element in the utilization of discretionary power by public prosecutors and 
by judges is that discretion may lead to disparity and arbitrary decisions. The way to deal 
with this problem is for the prosecution service a different one than for the judiciary. In all 
countries, equality before the law and the uniform application of legal rules are a focal 
concern. 
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56. Various ways exist to improve the uniform application of the law. All countries appear to 
be aware of the danger of inequality, and have accordingly taken appropriate measures to 
prevent its existence, such as building a hierarchical prosecution service with regular internal 
supervision, holding regular meetings where the actual prosecution policy is discussed, and 
issuing internal directives or guidelines aiming at consistency in the prosecution policy. 
These directives in many countries are called guidelines, guiding the public prosecutor in the 
process to take a decision on whether or not to prosecute. Guidelines seem to form an 
instrument for assuring the uniform application of the law. 
 
57. Guidelines are instructions to prosecutors regarding their prosecutorial tasks, 
particularly the initiation of the prosecutorial waiver. Various synonyms are used for 
guidelines, such as ‘instructions’, ‘directives’, or ‘circulars’. Whatever the term used, we will 
deal with the guidelines as far as they contain written instructions to members of the 
prosecution agency. 
 
58. A guideline can be defined as a codification of a specially defined rule of conduct, 
which the members of a certain agency are expected to observe when exercising a legally 
recognized or de facto autonomous power under an internal organizational order. 
 
59. Prosecutorial guidelines serve as indicators of the existence and the possible use of 
discretionary prosecutorial power within a country. These guidelines manifest themselves in 
two main forms: 
– those which give directives as to the carrying out of prosecution, and 
– those which contain directives for the waiving of prosecution. 
 
60. Even in countries which have adopted the legality principle, guidelines or instructions 
sometimes seem necessary for the uniform application of the law or for the explanation of 
new legislation. In countries where the utilization of prosecutorial discretionary power is not 
allowed, prosecutorial guidelines do not appear to be present. 
 
8. Aims of the guidelines 
 
61. Prosecutorial guidelines exist mainly for the purpose of avoiding arbitrariness and lack 
of uniformity in the use of prosecutorial discretion. The requirement for directives in order to 
achieve this end, depends on three subsidiary factors: 
– the explicitness of the regulations expressing the granting of the discretionary power; 
– the extent of the granted power; and 
– the number of persons possessing the power to decide on prosecution. 
 
62. These three factors carry a danger of arbitrariness in decision-making, and of the 
consequent lack of uniformity. The less explicit the regulations granting the discretionary 
power are, the wider the extent of their application, and the greater the number of persons 
actually exercising discretion, the greater this danger is. The guidelines aim at avoiding such 
danger by confining and structuring the exercise of this power to certain situations and/or 
cases. This is done, or at least should be done, by: 
– interpreting words contained in law which are too vague for application without their 
 explicit clarification; 
– restricting the application of the discretion to certain crimes or types of offences 
 and/or offenders, and/or excluding certain crimes; and 
– attaching certain conditions to the situations in question and/or the waiver or 
 prosecution itself. 
 
63. It may be concluded that the guidelines define, to some extent, the discretionary use of 
prosecution through the specification and clarification of the existing law. 
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64. In some countries, the prosecutorial guidelines aim to establish a desired criminal 
policy. The guidelines present the possible means for achieving set policies, to realize their 
actual practice in the criminal justice system. They may, in other words, serve as an 
instrument for attaining certain goals which await their practical application and realization. 
 
9. Adherence to guidelines 
 
65. Most guidelines governing the discretionary use of prosecutorial power are issued by 
the national top authorities of the prosecutorial hierarchy. Due to their formulation by such 
authorities, guidelines must be consistently and uniformly followed by those vested with 
prosecutorial power. The existence of the guidelines implies an explicit duty for the 
prosecutor to apply them in practice. Guidelines therefore primarily deal with the presence 
and the use of the prosecutorial power at the individual level. However, they may also 
prescribe a duty for the prosecutor to seek the approval of a higher authority for the use of 
this power in certain cases.  
 
66. Although the guidelines generally require strict adherence, the specificity of a particular 
case or a situation may demand deviation from this practice. Indeed, some of the existing 
guidelines explicitly express the individual and professional responsibility of a prosecutor to 
do so in unique cases. 
 
67. Because of the complexity of life, the guidelines are only to be followed in average 
(common) cases. Thus, in every case the public prosecutor shall independently, and 
conscious of his responsibility, prove what measures must be taken, and he can deviate from 
the guidelines because of the special character of the individual case. 
 
68. The contents of the existing guidelines for waiver of prosecution vary among the 
European nations. Some guidelines address certain specific crimes, and/or factors which are 
required for a prosecutorial waiver.  
 
69. In other countries, guidelines for prosecutorial waiver exist on a more general level. 
These guidelines do not define specific crimes and/or factual situations, but provide an 
overall general directive for the waiving of prosecution. To give an example: the law may 
allow the prosecutor to waive prosecution in petty offences, where the offence was 
committed due to forgivable heedlessness, thoughtlessness or ignorance, and where the 
public interest does not demand prosecution. This provision does not define “petty offence”; 
instead, general guidelines are provided as to the necessary prerequisites for the 
applicability of this provision. For instance, a property offence is to be considered as minor if 
only minor damages resulted from the offence. 
 
70. Within the judiciary as a rule no hierarchy exists and therefore in many countries there 
is no external superior body that can give instructions to judges on sentencing. That does not 
mean, however, that there exists great disparity. 
 
71. In some countries superior courts may give so-called arrêts de règlement, concerning 
the sentencing of certain crimes or groups of crimes. In other countries the judiciary itself has 
developed guidelines for sentencing. Finally there are countries where superior courts check 
the reasoning for the sentences and may quash a sentence when the reasoning is 
inappropriate. 
 
II. Levels of dependence and independence of the prosecution service 
 
72. The second chapter deals with the level of dependence and independence of the 
prosecution service. After I have dealt with the various forms of dependence and 
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independence I will discuss the question whether an independent prosecution service rather 
than a dependent prosecution service is likely to strengthen the independence of the judge. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
73. In all European states, regardless whether they are continental, central or eastern 
states, a state agency is vested with the power to prosecute deviant behaviour which 
constitutes a criminal offence. This does not mean, however, that the prosecution agencies 
in all European states have similar organisational structures, or that they are vested with 
similar prosecutorial powers and tasks. Moreover, the place of the prosecution service in the 
constitutional state organisation differs considerably. 
 
74. Although in quite a number of the Western European states the prosecution service has 
been based on the concept of the French ministère public, as improved and elaborated in the 
Napoleonic Code in the early nineteenth century, many countries have modified the basic 
concept, due to political changes and constitutional reforms. Certain classical basic principles 
for the prosecution service still prevail in the majority of the European legal systems. The 
most characteristic ones are: 
– the prosecution agencies are independent of the courts; 
– the prosecution agency is a centralised and vertically organised institution; 
– it is hierarchically structured and a line of command exists within the organisation; 
 and 
– the prosecution agency is organised with respect to the court system and the 
 administrative structure of the country. 
 
75. The same goes for the legal systems in the continental Central and Eastern European 
states. The legal systems of pre-1917 Russia and pre-war Eastern and Central Europe were 
typically continental civil law systems, not radically different from those existing in France, 
Germany and other Western European countries. 
  
76. However, the pre-revolutionary and pre-war legal systems have been replaced by legal 
systems based on the consolidation of state power in the hands of the ruling socialist party, 
although in Russia and the other former Soviet Republics more completely than in the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe. 
 
77. The ideas of political democracy, human rights, the creation of a rule of law state, and a 
new separation of state powers, which got full attention after the collapse of the socialist 
party rule in the late eighties and early nineties, have had a considerable impact on the 
organisation and tasks and functions of the public prosecutor’s office in the Central and 
Eastern European countries. In a number of these countries the prosecution service has an 
independent position (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary). 
 
78. The topic of dependence or independence of the prosecution service can be dealt with 
from various angles. It seems justified to distinguish between the external and internal (in)-
dependence and to distinguish between the institutional and functional aspects of the 
independence. 
 
2. External dependence and independence 
 
79. The external (in-)dependence deals with the question to what state power the 
prosecution service is subordinated or related. State power, according to the Trias Politica 
theory of Montesquieu, is divided into the executive power, the legislative power, or the 
judicial power. 
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80. In some countries the prosecution service is related to the executive power, so an 
institutional dependence exists. This, however, does not mean that the prosecution service 
has to be dependent as well with regard to its functional aspects. In some countries 
institutional dependence coincides with functional autonomy, such as in England and Wales. 
The English Crown Prosecution Service is headed by a state official (the Attorney General) 
with strong political links. The Attorney General is a member of the Government and may be 
dismissed due to lack of confidence from the Prime Minister. The Attorney General as head 
of the Crown Prosecution Service is politically responsible to Parliament. Despite the 
functional dependence the Crown Prosecution Service functions on the basis of considerable 
autonomy. 
 
81. In other countries like France, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, institutional 
dependence is combined with functional subordination. The prosecution services in those 
countries act under the supervision of the Minister of Justice who can issue directives to his 
subordinates concerning prosecutorial decisions to be made. 
 
82. In Western Europe the prosecution service is, as a rule, related to the executive power. 
The main exception however is Italy, where the prosecution service is related to the judicial 
power. So in Italy the prosecution service is an independent institution with full functional 
autonomy (Sect. 108 Italian Constitution). A similar situation exists in Latvia where the 
prosecution service belongs to the judicial power. The prosecutor is independent of the 
influence of other institutions or officials exercising state power and shall observe only the 
rule of law. 
 
3. Internal dependence and independence 
 
83. The internal (in-)dependence is related to the internal structure of the prosecution 
service – a centralised or decentralised structure – and the hierarchical links. In England and 
Wales the Crown Prosecution Service is a highly decentralised organisation placed under the 
authority of the Director of Public Prosecutions. There are, however, a small number of local 
divisions. The Chiefs Crown Prosecutors, heads of a local division, are responsible for the 
acts of their division to the Director. The hierarchical links, however, are quite restricted and 
the local divisions possess a considerable autonomy. 
 
84. In Belgium, France, and the Netherlands the internal structure of the prosecution 
service is a highly centralised one, characterised by a strictly hierarchical subordination. The 
rationale of this subordination is mainly that the prosecution service has considerable 
discretionary power when making prosecutorial decisions. The hierarchy and the right of the 
Minister of Justice to issue directives concerning the prosecutorial policy are regarded as 
essential instruments of the government to pursue a consistent and uniform criminal policy. 
 
85. The internal structure of the prosecution service in Italy is of a decentralised nature, 
without any hierarchical subordination. There is no hierarchical dependence among the 
various tiers of public prosecution offices. Each public prosecutor enjoys complete autonomy. 
The independence of the prosecution service and its members is quite similar to that of the 
judiciary and the individual judges. In turn, Italian prosecutors are not vested with 
discretionary prosecutorial powers because Italy strictly adheres to the legality principle. The 
lack of hierarchical subordination appeared not to be beneficial for an effective fight against 
Mafia criminality and organised crime. Recently new legislation has been enacted to provide 
high ranking public prosecutors with instruments to co-ordinate the prosecution of organised 
crime. 
 
86. In the past, the prosecution service in the Central and Eastern European countries was 
closely affiliated with the ruling socialist party and it was a strictly centralised institution. 
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Since the decline of socialism the service in those countries has, as a rule, been transformed 
into an institution independent of directives by the government or the socialist party. 
 
87. With regard to the topic of (in-)dependence, the Central and Eastern European 
countries can now be divided into three groups: 
 
- The countries that have maintained the independent constitutional position of the 
Prokuratura in its form inherited from the old regime belong to the first group. In these 
countries the Prokuratura is independent of the executive power but subordinated to 
Parliament. The situation in the Republic of Belarus can serve as an example. The Public 
Prosecution Office of Belarus is an independent state body, accountable to the Supreme 
Soviet (Parliament). The head of the prosecution service is the Prosecutor General, who is 
elected by the Supreme Soviet. Subordinated prosecutors are appointed by the Prosecutor 
General and are accountable to him. Although the constitutional position of the Prokuratura 
did not change, in practice the position is not comparable with that in former times. Under the 
old regime the Prokuratura was accountable to Parliament, read: the ruling socialist party. 
Now the Prokuratura is accountable to a democratic body. Other countries have chosen for a 
subordination of the Public Prosecution Office to Parliament as well (for example the Slovak 
Republic, Ukraine, Russia, Slovenia and Hungary). The power to appoint the Prosecutor 
General does not in all countries rest with Parliament, but a common feature is that 
Parliament is seriously involved in the process of appointment. 
 
- The second group consists of countries which have created a new type of independence, 
more similar to that of the judges. In these countries the Public Prosecution Office became 
part of the judiciary (for example Albania, Bulgaria, and Croatia). As a rule the Prosecutor 
General and his subordinates are appointed by the newly created High Judiciary Council, 
inspired by the High Council of Magistracy (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature) as known 
in France, Portugal and Italy. 
 
- In the last group, comprising e.g. Poland, the Public Prosecution Office issubordinated to 
the executive power, that is: the Minister of Justice. In Poland, the Minister of Justice 
exercises the function of Attorney General. In this capacity he is accountable to Parliament 
 
88. In the majority of the countries the prosecution service or the Public Prosecution Officer 
is internally organised in a hierarchical way. The head of the prosecution service is vested 
with the power to issue directives or instructions to his subordinates. This power restricts the 
internal autonomy of the prosecution service and influences the level of independence. The 
individual members of the prosecution service owe obedience to instructions from their 
hierarchical superiors. In a number of states, such as France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 
the Minister of Justice is the head of the prosecution service. In this capacity he can issue 
written circulars and guidelines or directives instructing the prosecution service to pursue the 
prosecution policy as determined by government. He can also give individual instructions. 
 
89. In these countries the instructing power of the Minister of Justice is restricted by the 
adagio ‘la plume est serve, la parôle est libre’ (the pen is bound, but speech is free), meaning 
that members of the service are bound by written instructions from their superiors during the 
pre-trial stage of the procedure, but that they resume their freedom when pleading in court. A 
written order from a superior to prosecute a particular case has to be complied with by the 
prosecutor, even if he thinks a prosecution is inappropriate. However, when this case is tried 
in court the prosecutor is free to ask for an acquittal of the accused. In case a public 
prosecutor does not comply with a written instruction form his superior, a disciplinary 
measure can be taken against him. 
 
90. In countries where the prosecution service is subject to the executive power, the power 
of the Minister of Justice to issue instructions is of a limited nature. One of the restrictions is 
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that an instruction or directive may not result in the effect that an individual member of the 
service is by way of a sanction deprived of (parts of) his prosecutorial powers. When 
appointed as public prosecutor, the law vests him with full prosecutorial powers. The 
execution of these powers cannot be restricted without grounds other than those stipulated in 
the law, such as suspension and dismissal. 
 
91. Another restriction to give instructions to subordinates is that the Minister of Justice 
may not give an instruction to waive a criminal case, or to suspend a prosecution, or to give 
instructions to request for a specified sentence in a particular case. The reason for this 
restriction is that such instructions would in fact imply an exercise of prosecutorial power by 
the Minister of Justice. Although the Minister of Justice is the head of the prosecution 
system, he is not vested with prosecutorial power because he is not appointed as a public 
prosecutor. 
 
92. In civil law systems prosecutors as a rule function in a hierarchical structure with strong 
internal guidelines controlling the use of discretionary prosecutorial powers. This is due to the 
aversion to prosecutorial discretion and the emphasis on uniform results in the civil law 
systems. This paradigm is not accurate, however, when applied to prosecutors in the Italian 
system. Over time, the institution of the pubblico ministero has lost the advantages of the civil 
law model: it lacks an effective hierarchical structure, strong internal guidelines, and internal 
controls. 
 
4. Accountability 
 
93. In countries where the prosecution service forms part of the executive power, the head 
of the prosecution service is accountable to Parliament for the prosecution policy pursued by 
the service. As a rule, the head of the prosecution service is not answerable for the exercise 
of prosecutorial powers in individual cases. He is answerable only with respect to whether or 
not he has issued instructions regarding the prosecution policy. 
 
5. Election or appointment 
 
94. Unlike the American legal system, where state prosecutors are as a rule elected by 
popular votes, sometimes after a quite intensive election campaign, in Europe at large 
prosecutors are as a rule appointed officials. In some Eastern and Central European 
countries the heads of the Public Prosecutors Office, the Prosecutors General and some 
high ranking prosecutors are elected as well, according to the wording of the applicable 
legislation, but this election is not at all similar to that applied in the American states. Election 
in the Eastern and Central European states either means nomination, or de facto, the 
election procedure may be regarded more properly as an appointment procedure because 
no democratic element is prevalent in this procedure at all. 
 
95. The way in which prosecutors are appointed may have an impact on the level of their 
independence. Being elected by popular vote could impair their independent position 
because in that system the prosecutor in pursuing a prosecution policy has to take the 
private interests of his constituency which has elected him into serious consideration. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
96. As we have seen in our presentation of the use of discretionary power in the CoE 
Member States, in a few countries the law provides that the prosecution service shall be 
independent in the exercise of prosecution. In other countries no such rule can be found in 
the Constitution or in the law. In most of the countries the prosecution service is 
hierarchically structured and hierarchy means that a lower ranking prosecutor is as a rule 
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subjected to instructions of his superior. There are only very few countries where the public 
prosecutor is as independent as a judge. 
 
97. In the preliminary views by the CCJE drafted on the basis of the points of the 
preliminary views by the Bureau of the CCPE, the CCJE expresses its opinion on the 
Constitutional safeguards/constitutional law considerations about the link between 
independence of judges and an independent exercise of prosecution, in particular with 
reference to instructions from the executive branch, as follows: “The independence of the 
prosecution service is an element which strengthens the independence of the judge: in 
certain countries, the Constitution provides that the prosecution service shall be independent 
in the exercise of prosecution. That is a very important guarantee, for its effect is that the 
political authorities can never prevent certain offences from being submitted for assessment 
by a judge. This also guarantees that persons in the public eye who are suspected or having 
done something wrong do not escape prosecution solely on the basis of a decision by the 
political authorities. This therefore strengthens the role of the judge in society, guaranteeing 
that the judge will dispense justice in all cases which deserve to e submitted for his or her 
assessment”. 
 
98. These views are in my opinion expressed too strong and in many countries, as we have 
seen, no such guarantees exist. I even dare to say that in no country a guarantee exists that 
a political authority never can prevent a prosecution for certain offences. Even in a system 
with a strict application of the legality principle – expressed in the Constitution – no 100% 
prosecutions are effected. In Italy around 74% of all suspects are prosecuted although one 
would expect 100%1. Nevertheless these views need further consideration. 
 
99. Indeed, discretionary power and the hierarchical structure of the prosecution service 
may be abused for political reasons. But guarantees, other than the independence of the 
prosecution service, can be build in the system in order to strongly reduce the risks of abuse 
for political reasons. In many CoE countries the discretionary power of the public prosecutor 
in practice is much less than could be expected according to the statutory formulation. 
 
100. The decision whether a prosecution of a crime is deemed necessary in the public 
interest must be based on an independent view. An instruction by a political authority not to 
prosecute undermines this legal character of a prosecution decision. The plea for an 
independent prosecution service is very understandable in the light of the fear that 
prosecutorial decisions may otherwise be strongly influenced by political views. 
 
101. Let us therefore look somewhat closer to the prosecution service in Italy, one of the 
very few countries where the public prosecutors have the same independence as judges. 
They are both magistrates and the independence of both is guaranteed by the Constitution 
(Sect. 108). No one has the power to give instructions to individual public prosecutors or to 
issue guidelines for a prosecution policy. No external control on the activities of individual 
prosecutors or the prosecution service exists. There is only an internal control by the 
Superior Council of the Magistracy (CSM). The only power of the Italian Minister of Justice is 
to set the budget for the judiciary and to initiate disciplinary procedures against individual 
magistrates. In Italy no coordinated national prosecution policy exists like in many other 
European countries because this is contrary to the constitutional independence of a public 
prosecutor. 
 
102. As we have seen in the first chapter, the annual amount of criminality and the 
insufficient financial resources to administer the whole amount of criminality asks for a 
prosecution policy, even in countries like Italy where a strict prosecutorial legality principle is 
                                               
1 Paul Smit, Prosecution and Courts, in: K. Aromaa & M. Heiskanen (Eds), Crime and Criminal 
Justice in Europe and North America 1975-2004, HEUNI 2008, table 5.3. 
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applied. The consequence is that the Italian State has to provide sufficient money to the 
prosecutor in order to allow him to finance all investigations and prosecutions he has decided 
or selected. Restriction of the financial means would be considered as an immediate attack 
on his independence.  
 
103. Another consequence is that an individual public prosecutor is not answerable for the 
expenditure of public money nor for the consequences of the investigation for the society or 
individuals. 
 
104. Furthermore the independence has led to judicial activism – a political way of applying 
powers – that initially may have had beneficial effects in the fight against political corruption 
but later on has led to serious abuse of power by individual public prosecutors like a nine 
years investigation to the relation between the organised crime and free mason that at the 
end led to a waiver. Over sixty persons suffered for years under the investigation and there 
was an extreme waste of money (Il caso massoneria). The reaction on the judicial activism 
has led to a contra-reaction by the political power like the adoption of legislation to extend the 
immunity of high state officials or to block the continuation of certain criminal proceedings 
against politicians. 
 
105. In general one may conclude that a fully independent prosecution service modelled 
after the situation in Italy is not a preferred option because in practice it may lead to a serious 
crisis in the Rule of Law Sate. It is of major importance that a public prosecutor when 
applying discretionary power feels free to take a decision which is consistent with the 
previous decisions taken by himself or other public prosecutors and furthermore feels free to 
take a decision which is impartial and is in conformity with the public interest.  
 
106. Therefore all international instruments and norms for prosecutors require that 
professional prosecutorial functions can be performed without intimidation, hindrance, 
harassment, improper interference or unjustified expose to any form of liability2. 
 
107. How to prevent that the executive power uses its power to instruct for improper 
purposes the prosecutor to prosecute or to waive a case? There are various solutions to 
prevent that the executive power abuses its power to give public prosecutors instructions to 
prosecute a case for improper purposes. One could e.g. statutorily allow a public prosecutor 
to file a complaint against such an instruction with the Superior Council of the Magistracy in 
order to assess whether the instruction is appropriate. 
 
108. One could also prescribe a special procedure to be followed in such a case. Such a 
special procedure has recently been adopted in the Netherlands (Sect. 128 Judicial 
Organization Act). When the Minister of Justice considers giving an instruction in an 
individual case, the Board of Prosecutors General shall be given the opportunity to express 
its views concerning the instruction considered. That instruction and its reasoning are sent to 
the Board, which gives its reasoned views. The instruction must be reasoned and issued in a 
written form. In very urgent cases, the instruction can be issued orally but shall also be 
issued in written form within a week. The instruction together with the considered instruction 
and the views of the Board shall be added to the case file unless this is contrary to state 
interest. In the latter case, a notification that an instruction has been issued is added to the 
case file. In this way the court is informed that an instruction to prosecute the case or an 
instruction on what sentence to request has been given to the public prosecutor. The court 
will certainly consider this when giving its judgment. The Minister of Justice is not only 
empowered to give the instruction that an individual case shall be investigated and 
prosecuted but can also issue an instruction that a case shall not be investigated or 
                                               
2 UN Guidelines for prosecutors, Sect. 4, International Association of Prosecutors Standards, Sect. 6 
and CoE Rec (2000) 19, Sect. 11. 
18 
prosecuted. In that case the Minister shall notify Parliament (both Chambers of the States-
General) that such an instruction has been issued. His instruction together with the 
considered instruction and the views of the Board of Prosecutors General shall be sent to 
Parliament. This procedure ensures democratic control over the Minister’s decision. Through 
this procedure, openness over the involvement of the Minister of Justice in prosecutorial 
decisions is guaranteed. This openness however is absent when the prosecution service 
agrees with the considered instruction and takes such a prosecutorial decision so that an 
instruction does not need to be issued. The starting point of the legislator adopting Sect. 128 
Judicial Organization Act was that there shall be a restricted use of instructions in individual 
cases by the Minister of Justice. Until now, the Minister has not made use of this power. 
 
109. It seems very important that instructions by the executive power whether these are 
general or specific, shall be transparent and open for democratic control. 
 
III. Matters affecting the relation between the public prosecutor and the judge 
 
1. The adjudicatory function of the prosecution service 
 
110. Until recently, a sharp division was made in the administration of justice between 
prosecutorial tasks exercised by a prosecution agency and the adjudicatory and 
dispositionary functions of the courts. This sharp division in functions has gradually become 
more vague due to the fact that the prosecution service in a number of European states has 
been vested with some adjudicatory and dispositionary powers as well. 
 
111. The main reason for this shift is related to the general increase in serious and complex 
criminality which has become apparent in recent years in many countries. Complex and time-
consuming criminal cases like economic and environmental crimes, transnational fraud 
cases, international drug offences, cases involving corruption and organised crime, are tying 
the court up for extended periods of time. The expansion of the judiciary has not kept pace 
with the increase in case-load, resulting in a considerable backlog. 
 
112. Due to the financial and personnel restraints, law enforcement is a scarce resource. It 
is increasingly difficult to ensure law enforcement. This difficulty not only reduces the public’s 
confidence in the administration of criminal justice but also makes it no longer possible to 
maintain a minimum standard of law enforcement, which is essential in any state based on 
the Rule of Law. 
 
113. When the gap between the number of law violations and the number of reactions by 
law enforcement agencies becomes too wide, the objectives of deterrence and uniform 
enforcement are not adequately achieved, and it is feared that the tendency of citizens to 
take the administration of justice in their own hands can no longer be satisfactorily kept in 
check. To avoid this situation, a number of legislative and practical measures have been 
taken. One of the measures was to vest appropriate bodies other than the criminal courts 
with adjudicatory and dispositionary powers. 
 
114. In almost all European countries various kinds of consensual criminal procedure exist 
and an increase in the various types of this kind of procedure is under consideration. 
 
115. The recent reforms of the codes of criminal procedure in France, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal have led to the creation of criminal procedures in which a criminal case is materially 
administered by a prosecutor and not at full length by a judge in a public trial. It concerns a 
pre-trial settlement of a criminal case with the consent of the offender. Plaide coupable, 
known in France, pattegiamento as this procedure is called in Italy, or conformidad known in 
Spain, are procedures similar to the plea bargain or sentence bargaining as known in Anglo-
American legal systems. 
19 
 
116. Through his confession the suspect opens the possibility that his case is tried in a 
shortened procedure. Very often the acceptance of a simplified procedure by the suspect 
leads to a serious sentence reduction or other advantage for the suspect. 
 
117. Although the judge is not bound by the negotiated result, as a rule the judge confirms 
the result in his verdict and imposes the negotiated sentence. In such a procedure the work 
of the public prosecutor closely resembles the adjudicatory work of the judge because the 
prosecutor has to check the existence of sufficient evidence against the defendant and 
furthermore has to make up his mind on the appropriate sentence – although formally 
imposed by the court. 
 
118. The ultimate consensual procedure is that the public prosecutor settles a criminal case 
without any involvement of a judge. 
 
119. In a number of countries the prosecution agency is vested with the power to settle a 
criminal case and to circumvent a trial procedure. 
 
120. According to those legal systems an offender can, at times, avoid a criminal charge by 
complying with instructions set in a transaction or penal order. A transaction is a unilateral 
proposal by the public prosecutor to the offender to pay a certain amount of money to the 
treasury within a certain period of time. After the offender has paid the proposed sum, the 
prosecutor no longer has the right to prosecute the case. 
 
121. In some countries transactions are only possible with respect to petty offences. In other 
jurisdictions, however, the prosecution service can use the power to resolve a criminal case 
on the basis of such an arrangement, even for crimes carrying a statutory prison sentence of 
considerable length (for instance Belgium five years and the Netherlands six years). 
 
122. Many countries have implemented a third form of settlement of a criminal case by the 
public prosecutor which contains consensual elements. It concerns the conditional waiver, 
which is explicitly expressed in the codes of for example Austria, Germany, Bulgaria, 
Norway, Denmark, and Poland. Without a statutory basis it is also applied in countries like 
Scotland and the Netherlands. In some countries legal provisions concerning a conditional 
non-prosecution only exist in relation to certain crimes such as drug abuse. 
 
123. The waiver is subject to general and special conditions which must be complied with 
before the decision of non-prosecution becomes final. 
 
124. In most penal systems the general condition attached to conditional non-prosecution is 
that the offender will not commit further offences during the probationary period. Special 
conditions may also be imposed. Such conditions usually aim at compensating society for 
the harm caused by the offence, or at changing the offender’s future behaviour. 
 
125. In general, a strong similarity appears to exist between a suspended sentence and a 
conditional non-prosecution. In many countries the conditions for a suspended sentence also 
apply to the use of conditional non-prosecution. Theoretically the conditions attached by the 
public prosecutor to a conditional waiver cannot be regarded as a sentence, but adjudicatory 
elements are present in the conditions and the conditions can be regarded as penalty-like 
sanctions. 
 
126. The most recent development to vest the public prosecutor with adjudication power is 
the adoption of the new penal order legislation in the Netherlands. 
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127. A weak point of the transaction is that non-compliance automatically leads to a trial. 
This automatism creates a lot of work for the prosecution service and the court. To avoid this, 
the prosecution service statutorily was recently vested with the power to impose sentences 
and orders without intervention by the court (Sects 257a-257h CCP). In a so-called penal 
order (strafbeschikking), the prosecution service may impose: 
 
– a task penalty to perform non-remunerated work or compulsory participation in a training 
course lasting 180 hours; 
– a fine; 
– a withdrawal from circulation of seized objects; 
– an order to pay to the treasury a sum of money to benefit the victim; 
– the withdrawal of a driving license for a period of up to six months. 
 
128. Furthermore, the order may consist of instructions to be complied with by the offender. 
Those instructions may not restrict the offender’s freedom of religion or his civil liberties. The 
instructions may consist of: 
 
– the surrendering of objects that may be eligible for forfeiture or confiscation; 
– the payment to the treasury of a sum of money that is equal to the profit of the crime; 
– the payment of an amount of money to a public fund the aim of which is to support victims 
of crimes. The amount of money may not be higher than the maximum statutory fine set 
for the offence; or 
– compliance with specifically-designed instructions during a probationary term of one year 
maximum. 
 
129. Before the public prosecutor may impose a sentence, he has to hear the offender in 
person or by telephone. In cases where the public prosecutor intends to impose a fine or 
compensation order of more than € 2,000, the offender is assigned a defense counsel for the 
hearing. For the imposition of orders, the offender does not have the right to be heard by the 
public prosecutor. The sentence or order becomes final unless the offender objects either in 
person at the public prosecutor’s office or by letter. In such cases, a court trial will take place 
(Sect. 257e CCP).  
 
130. The main purpose for this law reform was to extend the capacity of the criminal justice 
system by increasing the prosecutorial power to divert cases and to settle cases out of court. 
 
131. The penal order may be imposed for infractions and for crimes which carry a statutory 
prison sentence of six years or less. 
The right of the prosecution service to impose a penal order will be gradually implemented. 
Until 2012, the transaction and the penal order will co-exist. 
 
132. This new form of administration of criminal justice on the long run may have as result 
that small criminality as a rule is dealt with by the prosecution service – with an avenue to a 
court in case the suspect disagrees – and serious criminality is dealt with by a court in a full 
fledge criminal procedure. 
 
133. Since negotiated justice in many – mainly Western European – countries starts to play 
an increasing role, public prosecutors and judges have to cooperate more closely and 
prosecutors have to play more a judge like role. 
 
2. Public prosecutor: magistrate or civil servant 
 
134. It cannot be denied that the prosecution service has a special position within the 
separation of state power. On the one hand the service and its members are part of the 
executive power or closely linked to the executive power in systems where a political 
21 
authority like the Minister of Justice is the highest prosecutorial authority or has the power to 
issue instructions to individual prosecutors or to the prosecution service as a whole. 
Furthermore its position is special because in the majority of the CoE Member States the 
public prosecutor has a decisive say in whether or not a criminal case will be prosecuted and 
under what statutory criminal offence the case will be prosecuted. In some countries, 
however, it is not the public prosecutor who decides on the final indictment but the court.  
The special position of the public prosecutor in many countries has been discussed: is he, 
like a judge, a magistrate or is he a civil servant representing the executive power?  
 
135. In many countries the prosecution service is seen as an organ of the executive power 
that can be used to pursue a criminal policy that is formulated by the executive power. In 
those countries the prosecution service performs its tasks and powers under the political 
responsibility of the Minister of Justice who is accountable to the Parliament and who 
therefore is empowered to give instructions to the prosecution service as a whole and to 
individual prosecutors. In those countries the public prosecutor is considered to be a civil 
servant.  
 
136. In other countries like the Netherlands the legislature has chosen for a hybrid position 
of the public prosecutor. Public prosecutors are, unlike judges, not appointed for life and are 
civil servants as far as it concerns their legal status in the performance of their prosecutorial 
tasks, but according to the law, the members of the prosecution service are magistrates and 
are member of the judiciary (Sect. 2 Judicial Organization Act). In the Netherlands both for 
judges and public prosecutors the professional position is regulated in the same Act. 
 
137. The relation with the judge, to whom the public prosecutor has to answer in public for 
all his prosecutorial decisions, is always the basis and the orientation for every prosecutorial 
activity. The task of the prosecution service is to impartially and unbiased contribute to the 
gathering of evidence and to guarantee the legality of the investigation and prosecution. The 
judge in all aspects may expect that he can relay upon this. Therefore the prosecution 
service shall ensure that the court is provided with all relevant facts and legal arguments 
necessary for a fair administration of criminal justice, irrespective of whether these are to the 
advantage or disadvantage of the suspect. 
 
138. The public prosecutor has to perform his tasks in such a way that the judge can take as 
starting point that the prosecutorial powers have been exercised in conformity with his 
special position as magistrate. Both the judge and the public prosecutor have to contribute to 
a fair trial of the suspect, each from its own responsibility. 
 
139. In the code of conduct for public prosecutors the duty to behave as a magistrate is 
expressed. In many CoE countries such codes of conduct exist. Furthermore there are 
international standards like the IAP Standards of professional responsibility and statement of 
essential duties and rights of prosecutors adopted by the IAP on April 23, 1999. As far as it 
concerns the professional conduct of prosecutors chapter 1 of the Standards rules reads: 
 
“Prosecutors shall: 
– at all times maintain the honour and dignity of their profession; 
– always conduct themselves professionally, in accordance with the law and the rules and 
ethics of their profession; 
– at all times exercise the highest standards of integrity and care; 
– keep themselves well-informed and abreast of relevant legal developments; 
– strive to be, and to be seen to be, consistent, independent and impartial; 
– always protect an accused person’s right to a fair trial, and in particular ensure that 
evidence favourable to the accused is disclosed in accordance with the law or the 
requirements of a fair trial; 
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– always serve and protect the public interest; respect, protect and uphold the universal 
concept of human dignity and human rights”. 
 
140. These rules rule the position of the prosecutor in the administration of criminal justice 
and calls for a magistrate-like attitude in the performance of their duties. 
 
141. In many CoE countries the legal position of a public prosecutor seems to be that of a 
civil servant because their legal position is ruled in laws on civil servants or similar legislation 
– like in Austria, the United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia – 
and equals to that of a judge.  
 
142. In other countries the legal position of a public prosecutor is ruled in legislation on the 
prosecution service or on the office of the public prosecutor. 
 
143. In many countries the prerequisites for becoming a public prosecutor equal or are 
similar to the requirements to be appointed as a judge, as is e.g. the case in Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Italy. 
 
144. Public prosecutors and judges are employed and paid by the State, but their position 
differs in whom they represent. The judge represents the State in whose name he 
adjudicates, the public prosecutor represents the society in whose name he prosecutes. The 
aim of the judge and the prosecutor is the same: a fair trial for the defendant and a decision 
that is either a safe conviction or an acquittal. 
 
3. The professional status of public prosecutors and judges 
 
145. In many countries (for example France, Germany, the Netherlands) the professional 
status of a public prosecutor equals that of a judge. The wages of judges and prosecutors 
are more or less similar and the possibilities to make a career are of the same extent. In 
these countries it therefore occurs at times that a public prosecutor in the course of his 
career chooses to become a judge and vice versa. 
 
146. Quite often the corps of members of the judiciary includes both judges and members of 
the prosecution service. The statutes for the judiciary are therefore applicable to both judges 
and public prosecutors. 
 
147. As a rule there is no serious disparity between the prosecution service and the 
adjudicatory judiciary with respect to labour conditions. 
 
148. However, there is one main difference in the status of the prosecutor compared to that 
of a judge, due to the principle of hierarchy and subordination, which is only applicable to 
prosecutors and not directed at judges. The basic guarantees to protect the independence of 
judges are that they are appointed for life until their retirement, and that they cannot be 
suspended or dismissed by their employer. 
 
149. There is no hierarchical relation between the employer and the judge. Consequently, 
the judges of the bench are irremovable unless they agree to an appointment elsewhere. In 
many countries the irremovability of judges is stipulated in the law. Although the reasons for 
dismissal of a public prosecutor in many countries are similar to the reasons for dismissal of 
a judge, the official or body that has the authority to dismiss a judge differs from the official or 
body that has the authority to dismiss a public prosecutor. Prosecutors as a rule can be 
dismissed by the official or body that has appointed him/her. 
 
150. Judges cannot be dismissed by their employer but as a rule can only be dismissed by a 
judicial authority like the Supreme Court or a special court like in Denmark. 
23 
 
151. Due to the hierarchical relation, the public prosecutor can theoretically be removed from 
one part of the service to another without his consent by a decision of his superior. As a rule 
the reason for a removal without consent will be the well-functioning of justice. Such a 
decision may not be based on disguised grieves but may be made as a disciplinary measure. 
 
152. Moreover, a decision to dismiss a prosecutor can be made by the body vested with the 
right to nominate the public prosecutor. Such body may be the Parliament (for example 
Republic of Macedonia), the Ministry of Justice (Germany), the President of the Republic 
(Romania, Slovak Republic), the King i.e. the Government (Belgium), or the Supreme 
Council of the Magistracy or the Supreme Judicial Council (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and 
France). 
 
153. In some countries (for example Italy and Luxembourg) the public prosecutor enjoys the 
same guarantees for independence as judges, that is to say that he enjoys judicial 
independence and is appointed for life. The Italian prosecutor is a career bureaucrat with 
almost complete autonomy. A mechanism for automatic wage increases keeps the salaries 
of the prosecutors at the top of the pay scale for public employees. 
 
154. There is one striking difference between the status of prosecutors in Western countries 
compared with the prosecutors in Central and Eastern Europe. This difference concerns one 
item dealt with in the UN Guidelines on the Role of the Public Prosecutors: “Prosecutors like 
other citizens are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly”. In the 
Western European countries prosecutors are free to become a member of a political party 
and to be politically active, provided that these activities do not impair their proper 
functioning. 
 
155. In the majority of the Central and Eastern European states (for example Albania, 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Slovak Republic) party membership and political 
activities are explicitly prohibited to prosecutors. More in general they may not have other 
functions that may influence their autonomy or objectivity, or that may impair their social 
reputation. 
 
156. The prohibition to be a member of a political party is quite understandable as a reaction 
to the requirement of the past, when party membership was a prerequisite to become a 
prosecutor or to be promoted. It is also understandable in those countries where public 
services were over-politicised for several decades and where the political culture somehow 
differs from that of the traditional democracies. 
 
157. The system of promotion of prosecutors in many Western countries consists of some 
automatic elements and some elements connected with the assessment of the functioning of 
the public prosecutor. In the majority of the Eastern European countries systematic 
assessment and promotion seem to be non-existent. In as far as a promotion system does 
exist, this does not seem to be transparent. 
 
